Abstract
Introduction

CI-nets
are part of several languages for specifying and reasoning about preferences that are inspired by CP-nets [2, 10] (e.g. [16, 4, 5, 6, 17, 14] ). These languages have in common that assertions regarding preferences are interpreted via the "ceteris-paribus" or "all things equal" semantics. I.e. "A is preferred to B" is interpreted as a shorthand for "A is preferred to B, ceteris paribus". This allows the formulation of an "operational semantics" in terms of "worsening flips" for verifying statements regarding preferences computationally.
CI-nets distinguishing feature is that they are a framework tailored particularly for specifying and reasoning about ordinal preferences over sets of goods. These are also typically monotonic, i.e. more goods are usually preferred to less goods (of the same type).
Also taking in account the fact that more often than not goods come in multi-sets rather than sets, a natural question is whether CI-nets can be easily generalised to specify and reason about preferences over multi-sets as well as sets of goods. We here take up this challenge, providing some initial ideas on how to build a framework for the multi-set scenario on top of CI-nets in the sense that at least a restricted form of reasoning on our framework, which we call confined reasoning, can be efficiently reduced to reasoning on CI-nets.
The framework we propose is based on CI-nets, but can deal with what we identify as the two main differences of preferences over multi-sets and preferences over sets of goods. The first of the differences is obviously that, while preferences over sets involve comparing different combinations of a fixed number of elements (namely one of each item), when considering multiset preferences also the multiplicity of the items needs to be taken in account. So, for example, while in the set scenario preferring apples over oranges always is interpreted as "irrespective of the number of apples and oranges", in the multi-set scenario it is possible to say, for example, that one prefers having an apple over an orange if one doesn't already have any apples, but one prefers having an orange over some number (say, up up to three) apples if one already has some (e.g. two or more) apples.
A slightly more subtle issue is that, while when talking about preferences over sets there is a natural limit to the number of items one is considering (namely, one of each), in the case of preferences over multi-sets it is often the case that it is artificial to impose any a-priori upper bound on the multiplicity of the items. For example, when one says that one prefers having an apple and an orange over say even up to three pears, this also means that one prefers having two apples and two oranges over three pears, three apples and one orange over three pears, etc. If one is using the preferences as a guide as to what choice to take regarding some outcome, e.g. choosing between different baskets of fruits, then the upper bound of apples, oranges, and pears is given by the "evaluation context" (in this case, the upper bound of the fruits in the baskets that are available), but is not part of the preference relation per se. I.e., the same preference relation should be of use when considering a different "evaluation context", e.g. a different set of fruit baskets. Now, often when talking about preferences over multi-sets the multiplicities of items are not stated explicitely, e.g. one says that one prefers apples over oranges, which often may either mean that one prefers an apple over any (relevant) number of oranges, or that one prefers any number of apples over a comparable number of oranges. In the same manner, one can say that one prefers oranges over apples if one already has enough apples. We call such preferences purely qualitative. Although in the framework we propose here multiplicities of items are considered explicitely, we also show that certain basic forms of purely qualitative preferences can be encoded in it in a straightforward manner.
To further motivate our generalization of CI-nets in this work we also give an example of its use in the context of an argument-based system for the aggregation of evidence stemming from clinical trials [8, 9] . Specifically, we show how it can be applied to order the available evidence, which is then subject to further critical analysis by the system, based on personalized criteria.
As to the structure of this paper, we start of by giving the relevant background on CI-nets in Section 2. In Section 3 we then present our framework which, following the practice of Santhanam et al. (2013) (who present a variant of CI-nets for representing preferences among sets of countermeasures), we call C ℵ 0 I-nets (the ℵ 0 standing for the fact that our generalisation of CI-nets is designed for stating preferences over multi-sets with unbounded multiplicities). We here also discuss how to encode certain forms of purely qualitative preferences over multi-sets via C ℵ 0 I-nets and characterise reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets in terms of the above mentioned confined reasoning.
In Section 4 we present a generalisation of CI-nets for encoding preferences over multi-sets with bounded multiplicities, which forms the basis of the reduction of confined reasoning for C ℵ 0 Inets to reasoning on CI-nets that we also develop in this section. In Section 5 we show how C ℵ 0 Inets can be applied as a component of the before-mentioned system for evidence aggregation. Section 6 presents our conclusions and future work.
Background: CI-nets.
We begin by presenting CI-nets. Throughout this work we consider O to be a fixed finite set of objects, items or goods. CI-nets consist in a set of CI-statements. 
Definition 1 (CI-statement
Definition 2 (Semantics of CI-statements). A preference relation over 2
A preference relation over 2 O then satisfies a CI-net N if it satisfies each CI-statement in N and is monotonic. A CI-net N is satisfiable if there exists a preference relation satisfying N . Although there may be several preference relations satisfying a CI-net N , following Bouveret et al. we are mainly interested, in the so called "induced preference relation", which we denote > N . If N is satisfiable, this is the smallest preference relation satisfying N .
Example 1.
The following is an example of a CI-net from [3] . {a}, ∅ : {d} ⊲ {bc};
(1) {a}, {d} : {b} ⊲ {c}; (2) 
See Figure 1 for a graphical representation of the preference relation induced by the CI-net from Example 1. An alternative, but equivalent (see [3] ), way of interpreting CI-statements is in terms of worsening flips, similar to flipping sequences in CP-nets [2] . The idea behind this operational semantics is that in order to decide whether S a > N S b (S a "dominates" S b ) for S a , S b ⊆ O, one needs to find a sequence of worsening flips S a = S 1 , . . . , S n = S b where each worsening flip S i ❀ S i+1 (1 ≤ i < n) corresponds to S i > N S i+1 being sanctioned either (i) because S i ⊃ S i+1 (⊃ flip), or (ii) by a CI-statement in N (CI flip). Transitivity of the preference relation then allows us to conclude that S a > N S b . In particular, a CI-net N is satisfiable if and only if it does not possess any cycle of worsening flips. •
Definition 3 (Worsening flips for CI-nets
An equivalent but more clearly operational characterisation of the latter condition is that if
We denote the fact there exists a sequence of worsening flips from S a to S b w.r.t. N as S a ֒→ N S b . We will also often say that a flip is w.r.t. the CI-statement that "justifies" it. Then a sequence of flips is w.r.t. a a certain set of CI-statements when the flips in the sequence are w.r.t. the CI-statements in the set. Dominance in satisfiable CI-nets is PSPACE-complete, even if every CI-statement bears on singletons and has no negative preconditions, every CI-statement bears on singletons and has no positive preconditions or, finally, every CI-statement is precondition-free. Satisfiability of CI-nets is also PSPACE-complete. Dominance and satisfiability in precondition-free singletons (so called, "SCI-nets") is in P.
Bouveret et al. also identify coNP-complete as well as polynomial sufficient conditions to determine whether any CI-net is satisfiable. For instance, for the polynomial sufficient condition, let the preference graph G(N ) corresponding to a CI-net N , be defined as the graph whose directed edges are the pairs (o 1 , o 2 ) such that there is a CI-statement S + , S − : S 1 ⊲ S 2 ∈ N with o 1 ∈ S 1 and o 2 ∈ S 2 . Then, any CI-net with an acyclic preference graph is satisfiable.
C ℵ 0 I-nets
In this Section we present C ℵ 0 I-nets. First, we give their definition and extensional semantics, then we consider to what extent purely qualitative assertions regarding multi-set preferences can be encoded via C ℵ 0 I-nets. Finally, we present the operational semantics and, in this context, confined reasoning for C ℵ 0 I-nets.
Definition & extensional semantics
We continue to consider a fixed set O of objects and identify a multi-set M on O via its multiplicity function m M . The latter associates to each o ∈ O the number m M (o) of occurrences or instances of o that are in M. We will often represent a multi-set M in the form
We will also use standard terminology and notation for sets to be interpreted as the corresponding notion for multi-sets. M O denotes all finite multisets defined on O.
C ℵ 0 I-nets consist of a set of C ℵ 0 I-statements which, similarily to CI-statements involve a "precondition" and a "comparison expression". Preconditions of C ℵ 0 I-statements consist of what we call a sequence of simple constraints, i.e. expressions of the form
where o i ∈ O, R i ∈ {≥, ≤, =}, the a i are integers ≥ 0. We say that a precondition is defined on the objects o i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) and that a multi-set M ′ ∈ M O satisfies the precondition, 
t. a set of objects O is an expression of the form
where P + is a possibly empty sequence of constraints on O and P 1 , P 2 are update patterns defined on non-empty, disjoint subsets of the objects O. The C ℵ 0 I-statement is satisfiable if the precondition P + is satisfiable.
If P + is an empty sequence we write P 1 ⊲ P 2 . We will also often use the shorthand {o 1 , . . . , o n }Ta for any sequence o 1 Ta, . . . , o n Ta with T ∈ {≥, ≤, =, ++}. The intuitive meaning of a C ℵ 0 Istatement P + : P 1 ⊲ P 2 with
, ceteris paribus". The formal semantics of C ℵ 0 I-statements are, analogously to CI-statements, defined over preference (binary irreflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive) relations > over M O .
Definition 5 (Semantics of
Alternatively, by abuse of notation we define P + := {M ′ ∈ M O | M ′ |= P + } and for an update
. Note that if P + is unsatisfiable, then the C ℵ 0 I-statement P + : P 1 ⊲ P 2 is trivially satisfied by any preference relation over M O . Now, a C ℵ 0 I-net on the set of objects O is, as already indicated, a set N of
Finally, a C ℵ 0 I-net N is satisfiable if there exists a preference relation > satisfying N . Just as for CI-nets we are mainly interested in the smallest preference relation induced by a satisfiable C ℵ 0 I net N , which we also denote > N . The latter relation exists since the intersection of preference relations satisfying N also satisfies N .
We will later be able to show that N is satisfiable (see Example 7) . From this specification it follows that, e.g.
A proof of this is shown in Example 3, after having introduced the operational semantics for
Given the size of M O , we cannot even hope to give a graphical representation of the induced preference relation of the C ℵ 0 I-net in Example 2 analogous to that of the induced preference relation of the CI-net in Example 1 ( Figure 1 ). As hinted at in the introduction to this work, we will nevertheless later on define a form of restricted reasoning on C ℵ 0 I nets for which a graphical representation is at least in theory possible (note that in practice even graphical representations of most CI-nets will be too large to be of much use).
Proposition 5 in [3] states that all monotonic preferences over 2 O can be captured via CInets. The proof of this proposition can be easily adapted to show that all motonic preferences over M O can be captured via C ℵ 0 I-nets. In effect, consider a preference relation
Then there must be some disjoint and non-
Hence the preference relation induced by the C ℵ 0 I-net that consists of the C ℵ 0 I-statements obtained in this manner for each such M a , M b clearly captures >.
The obvious problem with this argument is that, such as the CI-net in the proof of Proposition 5 in [3] can have an exponential number of CI-statements, the C ℵ 0 I-net constructed in the way we have just detailed can have a potentially infinite number of C ℵ 0 I-statements 1 . We leave it as an open question whether there is any useful alternative characterisation of the kinds of preference relations that can be captured efficiently (hence, also finitely) by C ℵ 0 I (and, for that manner, CI) nets. In the rest of this work we nevertheless asume the C ℵ 0 I-nets we are dealing with have a finite number of C ℵ 0 I-statements.
Purely qualitative preferences
We now briefly consider how purely qualitative preferences as described in the introduction can be encoded using C ℵ 0 I nets. More to the point, we consider this issue under the assumption that purely qualitative preferences can be interpreted in precise terms, i.e. that they are shorthands for preferences where multiplicites of items are explicitely referred to. Consider first purely qualitative "comparison expressions", for example, an assertion of the form "I prefer apples over oranges". If this is interpreted as an assertion regarding multi-sets rather than sets of fruits, one possible interpretation of this assertion is "I prefer an apple over an orange". This can clearly be encoded easily using the
Other similar interpretations such as "I prefer an apple over a relevant/reasonable number of oranges" or "I prefer a sufficient number of apples over a relevant/reasonable number of oranges" can be encoded in a similar manner. "I prefer an apple over an orange" could also mean "I prefer a sufficent number R (e.g. R = 1) of apples over any number of oranges". Although C ℵ 0 Inets don't have any means of expressing "any", we can introduce the special symbol ## to be interpreted as the maximum number of each object given in a specific context (this will become clearer later on). We also use just o## as a shorthand for o + +##. Then, the following encoding would do:
Another possible interpretation of "I prefer apples over oranges" is "I prefer comparable numbers of apples to oranges". This assertion can only be encoded as a set of C ℵ 0 I-statements:
To avoid an infinite number of C ℵ 0 I-statements, the following alternative encoding will do for most practical scenarios
All of the above representations of "I prefer apples over oranges" can be easily generalised to statements such as "I prefer pineapples and mangos to apples and oranges". Nevertheless, we note that the generalisation of the last reading we considered would require exponentially many C ℵ 0 I-statements, e.g.
says that "I prefer pineapples and mangos to the same number of apples and oranges".
Consider now the preconditions of assertions regarding preferences, i.e. the "if X" part of an assertion of the form "if X, I prefer Y over Z". Some common pre-conditions can be easily encoded using C ℵ 0 I-statements. E.g. "if I have a certain number R of apples" or, similarly, "if I have enough (i.e. at least R) apples" can clearly be encoded as a = R, a ≥ R respectively. "If I don't have any apples" and "if I don't have enough (i.e. less than R) apples" can be encoded as a = 0 and a ≤ R − 1 respectively. Any combination of such assertions can also be efficiently encoded using preconditions of C ℵ 0 I-statements. Slighly more complicated are assertions of the form "if I have more apples than oranges". Here, again, several CI-statements are necessary:
Clearly, combinations of such more complicated assertions, e.g. "if I have more apples than oranges and more pineapples than mangos", require an exponential number of C ℵ 0 I-statements.
The fact that, in order to encode some purely qualitative assertions regarding preferences, (possibly exponentially many) sets of C ℵ 0 I-statements are needed stems from the fact that, as will become clearer in Section 4, C ℵ 0 I statements are ultimately based on CI statements. In particular, they inherit the "atomic" nature of CI statements. Consider, for example, that one has disjoint subsets S, S ′ ⊆ O and one wants to express the fact that any one element from S is preferred to any one element of S ′ . This can only be written as the set of CI-statements
An assertion with a precondition stating "if I have any elements from S and I don't have some elements from S ′ " requires exponentially many CI statements:
Operational semantics & confined reasoning
We turn to giving an operational semantics for C ℵ 0 I-nets analogous to that presented in Section 2 for CI-nets, i.e. in terms of "worsening flips". This will also be the basis of our definition of confined reasoning for C ℵ 0 I-nets.
Definition 6 (Worsening flips for
is called a worsening flip w.r.t. N if one of the two following conditions is satisfied:
for some M ′ ∈ P + or, operationally:
Again, we denote that there exists a sequence of worsening flips from M a to M b w.r.t. the
The following proposition can be proven in analogous fashion to the proof of Theorems 7 and 8 in [2] .
Example 3. Consider again the C ℵ 0 I-net N from Example 2. The following is a sequence of flips from which
The labels of the flips indicate the type of flip and, in case of a CI flip, the C ℵ 0 I-statement that justifies the flip.
From a computational perspective, a major difference between CI-nets and C ℵ 0 I-nets on O is that while for the former, sequences of worsening flips without loops can be of length up to 2 O (given that there are up to this number of distinct subsets of O), in the latter sequences without loops of arbitrary length are possible. Nevertheless, if a sequence of worsening flips from any one multiset M a to any other multiset M b exists then it will, by definition, be of finite length. Stated otherwise, such a sequence will contain only finitely many subsets of M O and, hence, can be said to be confined to any subset M of M O for which it holds that each multiset M ′ in the sequence is s.t. M ′ ⊆ M.
Definition 7 (Confinement of sequences of worsening flips). Let M ∈ M O . We say that a sequence of worsening flips
We can say that ֒→ N ,M defines a form of confined reasoning on N w.r.t. a M ∈ M O . Proposition 2, Corollary 1, and Corollary 2 are straightforward consequences of Definitions 6 and 7 as well as Proposition 1. They give a characterisation of reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets in terms of confined reasoning. 
Example 4. Consider again the C ℵ 0 I-net N from Example 2. This C ℵ 0 I-net has the property that the dependencies between objects as given by the comparison expressions are "acyclic". We don't develop this notion formally here, but it can be easily generalised from the notion of a CI-net having an acyclic dependency graph as defined in Section 2. This means that given an initial multi-set M a , lets say M a = {(a, 3) , (b, 3)}, one can compute an upper bound on the number of instances of each object one will be able to add to the objects in M a via worsening flips. Let #o denote this number for each o ∈ O. Then #a = 3, #b = 3 + (#a * 6) = 21, #c = (#a * 6) + (#b * 3) = 81, #d = (#a * 6) + (#b * 3) + (#c * 3) = 324 and therefore ֒→ N ,M , with 
and 
Confined reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets
In this Section we develop the fundamentals for computational procedures for confined reasoning for C ℵ 0 I-nets and thus, via corollaries 1 and 2, also for non-confined reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets. More concretely, assume one has a Specifically, in this Section we first introduce a generalisation of CI-nets for specifying and reasoning about preferences over multi-sets where the multiplicites of the items are bounded by some number. We call these C m I-nets. We then show how to translate confined reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets to reasoning about C m I-nets. We also finally give an efficient reduction of reasoning for C m I-nets to reasoning about CI-nets.
C m I-nets
C m I-nets consist of, as to be expected by now, a set of C m I-statements. These are defined in a manner that follows closely the definition of CI-statements.
Definition 8 (C m I-statements).
Let O be a finite set and M a finite multiset on O. A C m I statement on M is an expression of the form
Hence the definition in this case amounts to Definition 1. The semantics of C m I-statements also is a direct generalisation of that of CI-statements, although now defined for preference relations over 2 M . 
Definition 9 (Semantics of C m I-statements). A preference relation over 2 M satisfies a C m I-statement
A more operational characterisation equivalent to the latter condition is that if
We 
Translating confined reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets to reasoning about C m I-nets
Let N be a C ℵ 0 I net, M ∈ M O . We will in the following reduce confined reasoning w.r.t. N and a M ∈ M O to reasoning about a C m I-net on M. Our reduction will be in two steps. First we translate the
We will say that we are "reinterpreting" N w.r.t. M. In a second step it will then be easy to convert the
We will be informal in this section, since the translation is quite straightforward.
The basis of reinterpreting a C ℵ 0 I-net N w.r.t. M is to rewrite each C ℵ 0 I statement c = P + :
We will say that c is meaningful w.r.t. M if such a M ′ exists and call any such M ′ a multi-set that makes c meaningful w.r.t. M. Also, we will call such a C ℵ 0 I statement c ′ equivalent to c for M.
So assume we have a C ℵ 0 I statement c = P + : P 1 ⊲ P 2 that is meaningful w.r.t. M. Then, since c is also satisfiable note that the precondition and comparison expressions can be written in the form 
We re-label the objects in O * ⊆ O to {o 1 , . . . , o m } (m = p + q + r + s). We can now rewrite the precondition and comparison expressions of c as (we abuse the notation by using the same names as before)
where for each 1 ≤ h ≤ m we define
It should be clear that this rewriting produces a C ℵ 0 I statement which has the same multisets which make it meaningful w.r.t. M as the original C ℵ 0 I-statement. We further simplify the precondition P + to
where B − h is defined as
It should still be relatively straightforward to see that this rewriting produces a C ℵ 0 I statement c ′ that is equivalent to the original C ℵ 0 I statement c for M. As a consequence, we have that for the C ℵ 0 I net N ′ obtained from N by translating every c ∈ N that is meaningful for M in the manner just described, it holds that
Now, for the second step of our reduction of confined reasoning for C ℵ 0 I-nets to reasoning on C m I-nets, consider again a C ℵ 0 I statement c ′ ∈ N ′ obtained from a c ∈ N as described above. We now define
Its then relatively straightforward to see, first of all, that
Example 6. The reinterpretation of the C ℵ 0 I net from Example 2 w.r.
The translation to a C m I-net is then
Reduction of C m I-nets to CI-nets
We now reduce preferences stated via C m I-nets to preferences stated using CI-nets. More precisely, given a multiset M and a C m I-net N M on M we will define a CI-net N S M for a set S M and a mapping of every If j = 0, we define 
Clearly, in particular ss S M (M) = {S M }.
We will also (partially) order the sets in S M via the order > i defined as the transitive closure of the binary relation
Crucial for our purposes is that there is a unique maximal element
We denote this maximal element as M ′ . Note that in particular M = S M . Next we proceed to define for a C m I-statement c ∈ N M the corresponding CI statement c ∈ N S M . Assume c is of the form
There is also a unique minimal element
where
We denote the set of CI statements corresponding to the c ∈ N M as cs. Apart from having a statement c as defined above for each c ∈ N M , N S M also contains the set of CI-statements
Now Corollaries 3 and 4 basically follows from Proposition 4 which, in turn, follows mainly from lemmas 1 and 2.
The lemma follows from the fact that the set of all CI-flips "induced" by c ∈ N S M are of the form
and
) for every o ∈ O and it is relatively straightforward to see that for
Example 7.
The following is the CI-net corresponding to the C m I-net from Example 6.
Here
Note that the CI-net has an acyclic depdency graph. In fact, it is easy to see that the dependency graph of any CI-net resulting from the reduction of reasoning about an C m I-net which encodes confined reasoning w.r.t. the C ℵ 0 I-net in Example 2 and any M ∈ M O will be acyclic. This is an indirect way of showing (via Corollary 2 and the result from Bouveret et al. mentioned at the end of Section 2) that the C ℵ 0 I-net in Example 2 is satisfiable. Next we give the derivation w.r.t. the CI-net above corresponding to that of Example 3.
Encoding preferences in evidence aggregation using C ℵ 0 I-nets
In this Section we present a possible use case of C ℵ 0 I-nets. Specifically, in the context of the relatively recent argument-based system for aggregating evidence about treatments resulting from clinical trials presented in [8, 9] . We refer to the cited works for an in depth description of the system. See also [15] for results on the use of the system for aggregating evidence from studies about lung chemo-radiotherapy. In the already mentioned system evidence resulting from clinical trials is initially collected in the form of evidence tables of which Table 1 could be an extract (see Table 3 in [8] for a larger realworld example on which our example is based). This table summarises possible results stemming from meta-analysis (therefore the label "MA" in the column "Type") comparing two treatments-, "PG" for "prostaglandin analgoue" and "BB" for "beta-blockers", for patients who have raised intraocular pressure (i.e. raised pressure in the eye) and are therefore at risk of glaucoma with resulting irreversible damage to the optic nerve and retina. Each evidence item has an associated "ID" indicated by the entry in the column "ID". The meta-analysis compare the treatments w.r.t. different outcome indicators (see column "Outcome indicator"). The results of the studies are stored in the column labelled "Outcome value". For simplicity, the outcome values in Table 1 have already been normalised so that the values are desirable. This means that the outcome value in each row express the degree to which the treatment which has fared better in the study corresponding to the row, has indeed done better. The entry under the column "Net outcome" indicates which of the treatments fared better, with ">" meaning that there were better results for prostaglandin analogue and "<" indicating that the results speak for beta-blockers.
For respiratory problems ("respiratory prob"), cardiological problems ("cardio prob"), hyperaemia (redness of eyes), and drowsiness the outcome values express the relative risk of suffering the considered problem. E.g. for cardiological problems (evidence item e 05 ), this means that 82 people suffered respiratory problems when taking prostaglandin-analogue for every 100 persons suffering respiratory problems when taking beta-blockers. "change in IOP" and "acceptable IOP" are outcome indicators referring to raised intraocular pressure, with negative outcome values being good for the first and outcome values greater than 1 being good for the second of these outcome indicators. Now, given evidence such as is summarised in Table 1 , the question is whether prostaglandin analogue or beta-blockers are better to treat glaucoma in patients who have raised intraocular pressure. The obvious problem being that there is evidence in favour of prostaglandin analogue (namely, evidence items e 01 − e 05 ), but there is also evidence in favour of beta-blockers (e 06 − e 09 ).
A first step towards a solution of this problem is to help out the decision process by determining what sets of evidence items that can be used to argue in favour of the treatments are better in terms of preferences over the outcomes ("Outcome indicator") and magnitudes ("Outcome value") of the evidence items in such sets. Since we consider that the outcome values are normalised as detailed above, we call such "outcome indicator-value pairs" "benefits". More to the point, since for methodological reasons (mainly, to avoid bias and for purposes of reuse), preferences need to be determined independently of the available evidence, the preference relation needs to be in terms of possible sets of benefits, i.e. all possible sets of pairs of (normalised) outcome indicator-value pairs.
This process of ordering the evidence in terms of a preference relation on the "benefit sets" allows for the incorporation of a "personalised" dimension in the decision process, i.e. of considerations which have to do with, for example, a specific patient or the experience of the medical professional. Other more "objective" elements (like the statistical significance of the results obtained via the studies in further stages of the decision process as outlined in [8, 9] . In [8, 9] Hunter and Williams only consider the incoporation of preferences between sets of benefits in their system and for specifying such preference relations CI-nets are a natural choice (albeit, not one considered in [8, 9] ). First and most obviously because sets of items need to be compared and secondly, because preferences over sets of benefits can also be considered to be monotonic, i.e. having more evidence in favour of a treatment being beneficial can usually be considered to be better than having less evidence. Now, when one considers that there may be more than one evidence item expressing the same benefit, it is clear that at least theoretically the preference relation should be over multi-sets of benefits rather than sets of benefits. But also from a practical perspective it may often be the case that one should at least allow for both preferences over multi-sets as well as sets of benefits to be specified. Enabling this option becomes especially relevant when, as will often be the case, one introduces some abstraction over the outcome indicators and values appearing in the benefit sets (thus, simplifying the task of specifying the preference relation).
Example 8 illustrates the use of enabling encoding multi-set preferences by giving a specification of a preference relation over multi-sets of benefits such as those appearing in Table 1 but where we introduce a natural abstraction over the outcome indicators and values. First of all we consider both "change in IOP" and "acceptable IOP" as part of the "significant outcomes" which we denote "SO". Secondly, we partition the outcome indicators into "s", "m", and "l" standing for a "small", "medium", and "large" improvement respectively. We don't go into the details here, but Table 2 shows a possible result of applying this abstraction to the otucome-indicators and values appearing in Table 1 .
Example 8.
The following illustrates the use of C ℵ 0 I-nets for the specification of a preference relation over sets of benefits such as appear in Table 2 
In Example 8, the C ℵ 0 I-statement 14 basically says that evidence showing a medium improvement for any of the significant outcomes is preferred over any number of evidence regarding the side-effects cardio problems, respiratory problems, and drowsiness, as well as evidence showing a small improvement regarding the significant outcomes. Also having more evidence (exactly one more piece of evidence) for a medium improvement for the significant outcomes is preferred to having more evidence for a modest improvement w.r.t. hyperaemia (H).
The C ℵ 0 I-statement 15 states that having more evidence for a small improvement for both cardio and respiratory problems is preferred to having more evidence for a modest improvement regarding drowsiness. The C ℵ 0 I-statements 16 to 19 state preferences for the scenario where one does not have any evidence for some improvement in regards to one of cardio or respiratory problems. In this situation, for example having evidence for a modest improvement in hyperaemia is preferred to having evidence for a small improvement in only one of cardio or respiratory problems. The same holds for drowsiness (C ℵ 0 I-statements 18 and 19) although the standards here are set a big higher; one needs to have a difference in two studies showing a modest improvement in drowsiness.
The C ℵ 0 I-statement 20 states that if one does not have any evidence for a modest improvement in the significant outcomes, then evidence for even a small improvement for any of the significant outcomes is preferred to evidence showing an improvement in cardio problems, respiratory problems, and drowsiness. On the other hand, if one already has some evidence for a medium improvement in the significant outcomes, then also having more evidence for a small improvement in both cardio and respiratory problems is preferred to having more evidence for a small improvement in the significant outcomes.
Example 9 now shows the encoding of confined reasoning for the C ℵ 0 I-net of Example 8 w.r.t. the multiset
i.e. the multiset containing all benefits ocurring in Table 2 . Example 10 shows the reduction of the C m I-net from Example 9 to a CI-net. 
Example 10. Next we present the translation of the C m I-net from Example 9 to a CI-net. Figure 2 shows the preference relation induced by the C m I-net in Example 9, but considering only sets of benefits which all result from the same treatment according to the evidence in Table  2 . Now, one can take c-consistency w.r.t. M as an additional indicator to trust the specification of preferences in Example 8 is consistent (i.e. the C ℵ 0 I-net is satisfiable). Under this assumption, since there is a sequence of worsening flips even from {Sm}, corresponding to evidence item e 01 in Table 2 , to {D, D, D, H}, corresponding to the evidence set {e 06 , e 07 , e 08 , e 09 } in Table 2 , one can conclude from Figure 2 that prostaglandin analogue is preferred to beta-blockers as a treatment for patients who have raised intraocular pressure. Note, nevertheless that if, for example, one were to remove evidence item e 01 from Table 2 (e.g. because of statistical significance) then one would not be able to reach a decision between the treatments based on preferences alone.
Conclusion & future work
In this work we presented some initial ideas on how to build a framework for encoding monotonic preferences over multiset of goods on top of CI-nets in the sense that at least a restricted form of reasoning, which we called confined reasoning, can be efficiently reduced to reasoning about CInets. To the best of our knowledge this is the first work considering ordinal multiset preferences, certainly in the context of CI-nets.
Further investigation is required regarding the adequacy of C ℵ 0 I-nets (and CI-nets for that manner) for encoding multi-set preferences over goods. We have shown that C ℵ 0 I-nets can be useful in some contexts, such as for encoding some of the purely qualitative preferences we considered in Section 3 as well as a component of the system of aggregation of evidence stemming from clinical trials by Hunter and Williams. Nevertheless, we have also shown some limitations in our consideration of purely qualitative preferences and it remains to be seen if more complex examples in the context of evidence aggregation can be easily encoded using C ℵ 0 I-nets. Some progress may be achieved by introducing a further abstraction layer over C ℵ 0 I-nets. We have built our framework for encoding multi-set preferences on CI-nets because of our interest in preferences over multi-sets of goods, which are monotonic. But it would be interesting to explore encoding multi-set preferences using ideas from other formalisms which have been proposed for encoding preferences over sets, in particular that of Brewka et al.(2010) .
In this work we also laid the basic ground-work for computational procedures for reasoning about C ℵ 0 I nets via our characterisation of reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets in terms of confined reasoning and the reduction of the latter, first to reasoning about C m I-nets, and then to CI-nets. At the very least, our results allow for sound and complete procedures for confined reasoning about C ℵ 0 I-nets.
We note that this situation is in practice less clearly different to that of CI-nets and related formalisms (such as CP nets) than may appear at first glance. The reason is that the complexity of reasoning about CI and CP nets (see [7] for the latter) means that one will also for these formalisms usually have to rely on methods which, for example, are either incomplete or only complete for a restricted subset of the formalisms. Together with the fact that often specifications of preference relations induce preference relations which are themselves incomplete, this situation provides an additional reason for complementing preferences with other techniques, such as is argumentation in the system of Hunter and Williams, for purposes of decision making.
Nevertheless, the question of finding a multi-set that captures the preference relation for a particular evaluation context is an important question that remains largely unexplored in our work. Also, finding subclasses of C ℵ 0 I-nets beyond acyclic ones (or those stemming from CInets) where such a multi-set can be found or where satisfiability can be guaranteed are important questions. Likewise, complexity issues remain to be explored (in particular, for subclasses of C ℵ 0 I and CI nets; we note that several results regarding CI-nets, such as that for acyclic nets and also for SCI-nets, may be lifted to C ℵ 0 I-nets).
Equally relevant is considering adapting techniques for reasoning about CP nets "in practice" such as are considered in [1] (some of which are also discussed for CI-nets in [3] ) to the C ℵ 0 Inet scenario. Finally, computational procedures and systems for CI-nets such as presented in [11, 12, 13] can be adapted to C m I-nets or, alternatively, be optimised for CI-nets resulting from a reduction from C m I-nets.
